In 2006, the Treasury introduced a new Film Tax Credit for British productions. Fiscal incentives in the form of tax credits are now regarded as fundamental to the sustainability of the British film industry. In addition to benefiting indigenous filmmaking, an attractive tax credit structure is seen as promoting inward investment, chiefly from the USA, and is seen as important for maintaining the work force and organisational capacity in the British film industry. Securing the continuity of the skills base is at the heart of the UK Government's drive to make the 'creative economy' better fitted for global competition. However, in that broader context, film has been -and remains -a special case, as it is not presently Government creative economy policy to use fiscal measures for other industries. We argue that in seeking solutions to longstanding problems of 'sustainability', contemporary UK policy is conditioned by its long history of economic intervention in film production -and has been an important precursor of today's creative industries policy. Furthermore, in current global conditions, it is crucial to consider the fundamental cross-currents set in train by the competing demands of US inward investment and EU regulation. By undertaking interviews with key players as well as examining evidence in the public domain, this article analyses the complex politics that has shaped the implementation of this policy. We argue that film policy research needs the added depth that such sociological analysis brings to the table. In particular, this empirical approach gives insights into how the low politics of lobbying and inter-departmental rivalry shape present policy outcomes.
Introduction
This essay examines recent changes to the tax relief system for film production in the UK.
To date, scant attention has been paid to the complex politics underlying and impacting on the implementation of film policy. Nor has the role of different actors pursuing competing interests in the policy process received the scholarly attention it merits. Aside from anatomising these aspects of film policy, our analysis, therefore, also has a methodological purpose. In addition to interrogating a range of documentary evidence, 1 we have gone behind the scenes to interview key players involved in influencing and making policy. This sociological approach adds explanatory richness to film studies. It is important to underline the fact that behind policy as a product there is policy as a process -a recognition that points us to another level of explanation for outcomes that are publicly known and debated. It is striking, however, that in ostensibly democratic political cultures, very few know and understand the background strategies inherent in the policy process. This is especially so for of film policy -as compared say, with broadcasting policy. That is because film policy generally receives little sustained public attention. It is, moreover, a sporadic object of major policy intervention, unlike broadcasting. And it is much more arcane: the consultations are few and highly limited in whom they invite into the discussion, as may be seen from what follows.
Fiscal incentives for film production in the form of tax relief -the subject of this articleare a relatively recent feature of British film policy. This form of subsidy is given to particular industries when 'market failure' means that 'sustainability' without support is impossible. Once set up, therefore, film tax incentives are a mechanism for delivering subsidies to an industry without the direct intervention of government officials. The 
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We shall first sketch the history of government intervention into British film policy leading up to the recent tax relief incentives, noting the various forms of state aid provided to the industry. Our account highlights both change and continuity in film policy, illustrating how governments of different political persuasions have addressed the question of state aid for film from the 20 th Century into the 21 st . We argue that UK film policy exhibits continuity in its governing assumptions. First, there is a longstanding emphasis on the importance of safeguarding national identity through maintaining a film industry. Second, this is coupled with a recurrent need to invent new forms of economic intervention as older ones are deemed to have failed. If the wheel is not being reinvented, it is certainly being refurbished regularly. These two key elements -cultural nationalism and economic intervention -are at the heart of the UK Government's present 'creative economy' policy. i It is too little recognised that historically, film policy, has provided one of the templates for New Labour's decade-long attempt to steer the creative industries towards global competitiveness. However, film remains a special case, as it has not been UK Government creative economy policy to intervene in any other industrial sector using fiscal measures.
Against this backdrop, we analyse a key aspect of New Labour film policy, namely the review of fiscal incentives and the implementation of the new FTC in 2006. As we shall show, the FTC is a policy shared between HM Treasury and the Department for Culture, As our epigraph shows, the 'sustainability' of the British film industry is a current policy goal. What this actually means in policy terms is one of the themes of this article. A policy of sustainability is presently being pursued within a field of competing interests. In line with our sociological approach, we argue that it is essential to understand the interplay of these forces in order to grasp how current policy positions are shaped. At a global level, two key vectors need to be taken into account. On the one hand, there is the longstanding need to provide a system sufficiently attractive for the major US studios to make big budget films in the UK.
Media and Sport (DCMS
ii At the same time, however, it is also necessary to meet the requirements of the European Commission, for which 'indigenous' production conducted within the rules of the EU's Single Market remains a policy priority. To elucidate the processes at work, our account therefore identifies crucial moments in recent film policy, highlights key actors involved in the policy-making process and also considers the role of the different governing parties, ministries and stakeholders at various stages of policy change.
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A brief history of state intervention
John Hill has argued that film policy in the UK has a pre-eminently 'protectionist' cast as it is 'concerned with the preservation and support of commercial [British] exhibitors to retain a proportion of the ticket price and give half of this sum to fund British film production. The government sought to support indigenous film production with a scheme that would not be regarded as a subsidy. This approach was shaped by both external and internal factors. First, the scheme had to accord with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regarding state aid for film. And second:
The Treasury was opposed to a subsidy paid out of box office receipts because of a general dislike of parafiscal aids and an attachment to the principle that special taxes, like road tax, should be treated as a general revenue. There was also a danger that any form of subsidy would encourage other industries to clamour for similar favours. , although it provided an important lifeline for independent producers. Meanwhile, the value of the Eady Levy fund, determined by cinema admissions, had decreased with the decline in cinema-going. As producers received a proportion of the fund in relation to the box office success of a film, the fund tended to pay out to the more successful filmmakers rather than those most in need.
Similarly, the quota system had never proved to be particularly effective. Regional Arts Councils were in charge of allocating the Lottery money to film projects.
The distribution of Lottery funds was initially confined to capital projects and it took intense lobbying from some to have film accepted as a capital asset. 
New Labour film policy
The past two decades, therefore, have seen shifts in policy that have confirmed the perceived importance of film to the national economy. This view has been shared by both
Conservative and Labour governments. During the 1980s, the Conservatives first removed all economic support from a film production sector already struggling through lack of state aid and private investment. However, during the early 1990s, support was reintroduced through the fiscal system and Lottery funding. In May 1997, the very week that the film franchises were awarded, New Labour, led by Tony Blair, won the General Council', which was finally established in 2000. As we shall see, the next phase in the evolution of fiscal policy involved activity by a major new actor on the scene.
Setting up the Film Council
The establishment of the Film Council was regarded as a 'major shift in Government policy for film' xxxiv and was described by its first Chair, Alan Parker, as 'the most radical shake The Film Council sits smack in the middle between the Government and the industry, and one of its key functions is to act as a kind of translator. Our job is to explain the industry to the Government, because the Government … knows relatively little about the film industry… And vice versa, the UK Film Council is there to explain the Government to the film industry, because the film industry cares relatively little about the Government as long as the money's coming in… I think that perhaps our mistake was not making it clearer from the start that the establishment of the UK Film Council did not now mean that the film industry had a direct line to Government, and that it would get everything it wanted. It was never going to be that way. Cinema and Television (PACT) had both argued that structural changes becoming apparent in the industry were largely due to fiscal incentives, and to maintain these predictability was required, as opposed to the current ''boom and bust' seven year cycle'
(ibid: 32). Meanwhile, the Hollywood studio heads had referred to growing competitiveness between filmmaking destinations, such as Canada, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and the Czech Republic, noting that the UK's current fiscal structure had 'created a level playing field', thereby bringing other criteria 'such as facilities and talent'
to the fore in deciding where a film is made (ibid: 32, 33).
Nevertheless, it was widely believed that Section 48 needed to be revised. The Film Meanwhile, as this 'official review' was taking place, the Treasury was carrying out its own consultation, as well as liaising with other stakeholders behind closed doors.
Meetings were organized for independent film producers to meet personally with the film taxation team and give their views on policy proposals. Additionally, all the US studios met Treasury personnel, as their endorsement of the new fiscal structure was vital. It is open to question whether the DCMS and UKFC were centrally involved in these discussions. John Woodward has said that he was in direct talks with ministers at this time. However, when asked whether the UKFC would work closely with government in designing the new tax relief system, Woodward replied:
The truth is, and I'm afraid that this is an inescapable reality of Government, the Treasury doesn't work that way. They talk to you, they listen, they ask, they take the views and then they shut the doors and say, 'Thank you very much, we'll come back to you', and then they announce. It's a fact of political life in Britain. 
The European Union and the Cultural Test
So far, we have illustrated how a fiscal structure for film has been developed in the UK.
Fiscal incentives, initially conceived under a Conservative administration, became central to New Labour film policy. The approach taken rests predominantly on the need to offer attractive tax incentives to encourage inward investment from the US. The influence of US stakeholders on government in devising and implementing this framework is clear.
The pre-eminent role of HM Treasury, the driving force behind the implementation of tax reliefs, has been demonstrated, despite the policy being shared with the DCMS.
In 2005, the DCMS announced its intention to introduce a new 'cultural test': this would determine whether a film was 'British' and therefore whether or not it was eligible for tax incentives. In this way, a 'cultural' criterion was brought together with more selfevidently economic ones. The cultural test was to replace previous criteria for defining films as 'British' (outlined in Schedule 1 of the 1985 Finance Act). These had focused on the level of UK spend and the number of British film practitioners working on a production. The method for testing a film's British credentials had changed little since its introduction in conjunction with the screen quota system in 1927. points out of a possible 32. 'Cultural content' could be awarded up to 4 points), 'cultural hub' relating to the location of production and post-production facilities and activities could score up to 15 points, and finally, the nationality of key 'cultural practitioners' could bring in up to a further 13 points.
The fact that the largest single number of points was allocated for being a 'cultural hub' drew on broader New Labour creative industries policy, which emphasised maintaining the UK's skills base. To this end, film policy now prioritised US inward investment, which could benefit from a state aid structure comparable to other film locations around the world. This was justified as 'a positive attempt to develop a sustainable film industry through the development of an indigenous film industry in a highly transnational The amended test differed greatly from the first version, with more emphasis placed on cultural factors. It still comprised three key sections, and 16 points was still the required pass mark. However, the apportionment of points to each section had changed considerably. The number of points for 'cultural content' rose from 4 to 16, whereas 'cultural hub' was reduced from 15 to 3. Films could now score no more than up to 8 points for British 'cultural practitioners' (down from 13). Meanwhile, a fourth section was added for 'cultural contribution', whereby producers could score up to 4 points by demonstrating the role of their film in the 'promotion, development and enhancement of British culture'. lxxxii The test was also subject to a 'Golden Point Rule': this prevented films with no British content except the English language from being made in the UK.
This aimed at stopping US studios from making US films in the UK and thereby becoming beneficiaries of the FTC.
lxxxiii
Conclusion
We have argued in this essay that UK film policy should be understood as the outcome of contending political, economic and cultural forces and -at the same time -as the product of a long history of state intervention. Since the 1920s, British policy makers have sought to address competition from Hollywood by using a succession of economic measures.
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The most recent of these is the Film Tax Credit. This is just the latest instance of a longterm policy bias towards giving film special treatment. For HM Treasury, the FTC is first, intended to encourage the production of films that might otherwise not be made. Second, it is meant to promote the 'sustainability' of British film production. And third, fiscal policy is supposed to maintain a 'critical mass' in the UK's infrastructure for creative and technical skills. productions, chiefly from the US studios, which accounted for 71% of overall expenditure on production. The rationale for the FTC could hardly be clearer, given the strategic dependence of the entire film economy on the core contribution of US investment.
lxxxv It is clear from our account that the Treasury's capacity to control the broad conditions that shape the environment for film production in the UK is limited. The British film industry has been profoundly shaped by its relationship to Hollywood for the best part of a century. Now, as the EU's impact on competition policy becomes increasingly felt, this too has to be factored in, as was evident from the recasting of the Cultural Test under pressure from Brussels.
Effective competitiveness for UK plc across all fronts has been a preoccupation of New Labour in office from the very start. As the UK's creative industries have been seen as enjoying a special advantage in the global economy, the DCMS has for more than a decade argued for enhancing the importance of this sector. Film -as one of the 13 industries designated 'creative' -has come under the aegis of this policy drive, and indeed, formed part of the context in which the UKFC was set up as a bridge between government and the film industry. However, as we have shown, the low politics of interdepartmental competition has meant that the small and weak DCMS has shaped the economic aspects of its policy in line with the Treasury's thinking. Consequently, while at first glance it looks as though the FTC is a quintessential measure of creative industries policy, which emphasises the development of the talent base in order to engage in global competition, that is far from the case. lxxxvi The FTC is entirely of a piece with the Treasury's historical interventionism. Film policy has always borne the distinctive stamp of the Treasury's thinking, where the perceived special status of film has resulted in distinctive fiscal measures not so far afforded any other of the creative industries. Film is somehow seen as a special asset to the national economy and to a lesser extent, as crucial to national identity. This standpoint, deriving from longstanding competition with Hollywood, has been deeply encoded in British policy-making, irrespective of party. The creation of the FTC, devised during Gordon Brown's watch at the Treasury, undoubtedly benefited from the fact that the Chancellor was known to be 'sympathetic' to the film industry.
Our sociological approach to film policy has begun to unravel some of the plays made by the DCMS and the Treasury over the ownership of policy. It has also allowed us to illustrate aspects of the complex and obscure dynamics of lobbying that has long surrounded film policy and which became particularly prominent under New Labour.
Expertise -especially that mobilised through the use of film industry figures -has shaped the debate and secured policy outcomes. So too have the contradictory pulls across the Atlantic of the USA and the EU. British film policy has now reached its most recent fiscal accommodation. Just how long this will last -as the new loopholes in the Film Tax
Credit are discovered and exploited -is quite another question.
